Field Service Pocket Book Part I - Pamphlet No. 3 ABBREVIATIONS


FIELD SERVICE POCKET BOOK Part I—Pamphlet No. 3, 1943


For use in the field and during training


1. When any word or phrase requires abbreviating, and is covered by this pamphlet, only the authorized version as shown will be used. Officers are not expected to memorize all the abbreviations given in this pamphlet.

2. Abbreviations in general, and in particular those not included in these tables, will be used only when the writer is satisfied that there can be no possibility of the reader mistaking their meaning. This applies mostly to special or technical services and units who may use within their own spheres well-known abbreviations which are not shown in this pamphlet. Care should be taken that in any papers or messages which may go to other arms or units the abbreviations used are explained, or the full text inserted, if there is any possibility of misunderstanding.

Field Service Pocket Book Part I - Pamphlet No. 1 GLOSSARY OF MILITARY TERMS



Part I—Pamphlet No. 1, 1944



The object of this pamphlet is to define tactical and administrative terms and expressions in general use in the Army. Note that:—

(a) A term not listed under the first word may be found under one of the other words.

(b) Authorized abbreviations are shown in brackets.

(c) Only terms that might not be familiar to regimental officers have been included. Blank pages are provided at the end of the pamphlet on which individual additions to the glossary can be made.

Field Service Pocket Book (Cover) Field Service Pocket Book (Page 1)

King George VI message to King Leopold of Belgium

King Leopold of Belgium and King George VI

A newly released document at the National Archives reveals a contentious message from King George VI to King Leopold of Belgium. In the message, sent as a War Office telegram on 26th May 1940, King George VI urges Leopold to leave Nazi occupied Belgium in order to establish a united Government. The King suggests that there would be no practical benefit for Leopold to stay in his country under German occupation and further points out the only likely outcome would be for Leopold to be made a prisoner of the Germans. In such circumstances he would no longer be in a position to continue his duty to the Belgian people.

The following day, King Leopold sent a telegram to Lord Gort, the Commander of British Forces, notifying Gort of his intention to surrender due to the deteriorating military situation and before the invertible debacle.

After the Second World War, King Leopold’s decision to stay in Belgium during the occupation without taking any active role in continuing the fight against Fascism, led to considerable criticism from his people. Originally the newly released document containing this correspondence was intended to be closed to the public until the year 2050. It mostly contains correspondence from the immediate post war period debating whether the British Government should release a copy of the telegram following controversy in the Belgian press over Leopold’s decision to surrender and of the existence of correspondence between the two kings.

A transcript of King George VI’s telegram and  King Leopold’s reply to Lord Gort is reproduced below.



Letter from H.M. The King to King Leopold of Belgium 26.5.40

I am very grateful for your letter. I note that Your Majesty considers it to be your duty to  your people and to your Allies to remain with your Army in Belgium. In taking this decision Your Majesty will not have overlooked the extreme importance of establishing a united Belgian Government with full authority outside territory occupied by the enemy, and while paying tribute to Your Majesty’s devotion, I and my Government must express our grave concern at your decision.

While it would be presumptuous of me to advise you in respect of your duty to your people, I can say that as regards the Allies and the fulfilment of their joint purpose in war, I do not feel that Your Majesty is called upon to make the sacrifice which you contemplate.

Moreover, I am bound to put to Your Majesty another point. If it were possible for you to remain in Belgium at liberty to mix with your people, and to act and speak for them, there might be great value in the establishment of such a rallying point necessary to the Belgian Nation. But I can hardly hope such would be the outcome of Your Majesty’s decision to stay with the Army. It seems to me that Your Majesty must consider the possibility, even probability of your being taken prisoner, perhaps carried off to Germany, and almost certainly deprived of all communication with the outside world. Such a position would leave your People bereft of their natural leader, without so far as I can see any compensating advantage.

(Signed) GEORGE R.I.


Message from King Leopold of Belgium to Lord Gort, 27.5.40

He wishes you to know that his Army is greatly disheartened. It has been incessantly engaged for four days and subjected to intense air bombardment, which the R.A.F. have been unable to prevent. The knowledge that the Allied Armies in this sector have been encircled, and that the Germans have great superiority in the air, has led his troops to believe that the position is almost hopeless. He fears a moment is rapidly approaching when he can no longer rely upon his troops to fight or be of any further use to the B.E.F. He wishes you to realise that he will be obliged to surrender before a debacle.

The King fully appreciates that the B.E.F. has done everything in its power to help Belgium, and he asks you to believe that he has done everything in his power to avert this catastrophe.


(Source: TNA FO 371/79035, transcribed by, 29 January 2017)

What German Intelligence learned from Allied Aircrew Documents

Germany and the German Air Force

Not to be Taken into the Air—I

What German Intelligence learned from Allied Aircrew Documents

The Responsibilities of a Prisoner of War


Examination of members of the staff of Dulag Luft has made it possible for the first time to appreciate to what extent the Germans were able to extract intelligence from documents and papers carried by Allied aircrew captured in operations over Germany and German-held territory.

Speaking generally, P/W expressed the opinion that it was not the security principles or the instructions issued to aircrew that were responsible for the wealth of documentary information that fell into the hands of Dulag Luft, but rather failure of aircrew to execute the security instructions received. Over and over again notebooks, diaries, letters and scraps of paper were found in the possession of captured crews or recovered from crashed aircraft. Though it is difficult to assess the value of the information thus conveyed gratis to the enemy, that value was undoubtedly very high. Some idea of the type and intelligence value of the information extracted by Dulag Luft from documents that should not have been carried can be gleaned from the examples cited in the first part of the present article. The conclusion to be drawn is that aircrews were insufficiently aware of the intimate relation existing between interpretation of documents and interrogation. In numberless cases the essential clues or reference points were furnished to the interrogators at Dulag Luft by the Documents Section only because a member of an aircrew had not emptied his pockets before an operation. It is perhaps worth emphasising that the ordeal of interrogation would have been vastly lightened in many cases if the instructions not to carry private papers had been scrupulously observed.

According to P/W, useful documents and notes were carried with particular frequency by members of aircrews with little operational experience; he ascribes this fact as not necessarily due to deficiency in security but rather to the beginner’s anxiety to refer to the notes he had made during his training and to a mistrust of his memory.


The general object pursued in the interpretation of documents at Dulag Luft was to furnish the interrogators with the maximum amount of information before interrogation commenced. In this way interrogators often succeeded in impressing P/W with their knowledge to such an extent that the latter would talk freely.

The work of evaluation of documents was mainly concentrated on the following points:—

(a) Determination of P/W’s unit.

(b) Target, mission and incidents during the flight.

(c) New equipment and new methods of attack.

(d) Losses and replacements.

(e) Training.

(f) Ferrying flights to Europe and Africa.

(g) Morale.

The attention paid by the document evaluators to each of these points and the methods they pursued are given in some detail below:—


Determination of the unit was a matter of primary importance in the work of the Documents Section, for once the unit of a P/W had been established, it was usually possible for the section concerned with unit history to furnish an abundance of facts which, when communicated to P/W, would tend to loosen his tongue.

The following is a description of the various clues pursued in the endeavour by the documents evaluation section to establish a P/W’s unit.

Squadron Markings and Registration Numbers on Aircraft. These were systematically registered in a list which was scrupulously kept up to date. The list was most complete in the case of R.A.F. Bomber Command units, less complete for Coastal and Fighter Command units. The registration numbers on the tails of aircraft were also listed. The squadron concerned in the attack on the Mohne Dam was, according to P/W, established from the registration number of one of the participating aircraft which crashed.

R.A.F. Identity Cards. The old 1250’s were extremely useful because they recorded a history of the various units to which bearers had been posted. Even when these unit descriptions were blacked out at a later period, it was still sometimes possible to read the entries. The pink 1250’s which were introduced shortly before D-Day caused the documents section a considerable headache at first, but even so the serial numbers, the numbers on the rubber stamps and the signatures were found useful. After the documents section had revised its system it was often able to determine a P/W’s unit or, at least, his Conversion Unit from the pink 1250 and to identify flight mechanics as such.

U.S.A.A.F. Identity Cards. In the majority of cases, the original U.S.A.A.F. identity cards, particularly those issued to officers, bore the name of the school at which commissioning had taken place, and thus furnished a clue to function in the aircraft. The new identity cards were considerably less informative but still gave some indication of the station in the U.S.A. at which operational training had taken place or of the date on which the bearer had been staged to the theatre of operations.

Photographs. The photographs on escape passports carried by U.S.A.A.F. aircrew shot down over Europe also helped to identify the unit. Photographs issued by the U.S. 91st Heavy Bomber Group, for instance, were at first recognisable by the fact that all the enlisted men and N.C.O.’s wore cotton shirts, and all the officers O.D. Shirts. Later, all the passport photographs of this unit were finished in an easily recognisable brown tone, which was peculiar to this unit. Photographs of the 95th Heavy Bomber Group originally showed aircrew wearing a suit of uniform pattern, and had a dull grey background; later, however, suits with a striking check pattern and ties of elaborate design were worn. Photographs of the 100th Heavy Bomber Group were characterised by their small and distinctive shape. The 381st Heavy Bomber Group at first photographed its aircrew dressed in light coloured shirts, and wearing a simple dark tie. Aircrew of the 305th Heavy Bomber Group at first carried photographs exactly as they had been issued by the Group Intelligence Officer. It could be observed that aircrew had hurriedly put on a civilian shirt and a civilian coat merely for the purpose of being photographed, and the naked thigh was frequently visible. Members of the 94th Heavy Bomber Group were easily identified by the dark finish of their photographs, by an inscription on the upper margin and by the patterns of their ties.

The photographs of the 303rd Bomber Group could be recognised by a beige strip on which the bearer’s name was written, and which was pasted on to the bottom of the envelope. Another Group, again, could be recognised by the reddish-violet colour of the cellophane envelope containing the photograph.

British escape passport photographs were less informative, as they were issued by operational units at the beginning of the war only. Those encountered later had usually been taken at an O.T.U. or Conversion Unit, but even this gave a clue to the bearer’s training and, in the case of the C.U., to the Bomber Group to which the bearer belonged.

A few units, including No. 103 R.A.F. Squadron at Elsham Wolds, could be readily identified by the typical lettering on the escape kits, although the inscription made no mention of the actual unit.

U.S.A.A.F. Ration Cards. The ration cards carried by U.S. aircrews were so useful for purposes of unit identification and history that a separate card-index was kept for them. British ration cards were much less useful, and information obtained from them was not separately card-indexed. When the U.S.A.A.F. first came to Europe each Group issued its own ration cards, but subsequently standard cards were issued to all airmen in the E.T.O. For unit identification purposes, the method of cancellation was found to be very useful. In the case of the U.S. 100th Bomber Group, it was discovered that cancellation was being effected by means of a thick black pencil (and later by coloured pencils), and that the card had been placed on a roughly planed table surface. It was subsequently discovered that it was possible to determine most of the U.S. Heavy Bomber Groups by carefully studying the technique of cancellation.

British Ration Cards. British ration cards were only occasionally informative. Such entries on these cards as “Sergeants’ Mess,” followed by the name of the station, were occasionally found. In some instances a ration card gave evidence of the length of time its owner had spent in his unit and occasionally a transfer could be deduced.

Other sources of information were bicycle or similar licences, bomber code covers, which appeared to have been supplied to stations in numerical sequence, and U.S.A.A.F. start sketches and formation charts. Bomb loading tickets, both U.S. and British, gave, in addition to the valuable information concerning the bomb load, type and distribution of bombs, fuses, etc., as well as an indication of the unit. P/W also mentioned that laundry marks on underclothing and handkerchiefs very frequently supplied a clue to the unit of a captured crew.

Target, Mission and Incidents during the Flight

Information bearing on target and mission was usually found in the captured logbooks of British crews, or in the case of certain U.S. units, in operational orders issued to pilots and bombardiers. Handwritten notes made by British crews during briefing were frequently captured, and though these were often extremely difficult to decipher, they were frequently very informative.

An excellent example of the value of such notes occurred after the R.A.F. raid on Leipzig on the night of the 20th October, 1943, when a small, dirty and oil-stained piece of paper was discovered in an aircraft shot down in the course of the raid. Some notes scribbled on this piece of paper gave in a few significant words the entire plan of attack, the bomb load, the methods of target marking employed, the turning points on the route of approach and instructions on the release of “Window.”

The “Captain of Aircraft Maps” issued by the R.A.F., always gave a clear picture of the plan of attack, particularly when pilots added notes of their own. In many cases information was gleaned from log books or from separate notes on previous missions or planned missions.

It was proved to be possible to forecast targets which the enemy was planning to attack from the captured plans of attacks which had manifestly been cancelled at the eleventh hour, and to inform the appropriate defence units in time for the subsequent attack. As an example of this, P/W stated that captured documents had shown that the first daylight raid on Bruex had been planned for the beginning of April, 1944, but had not then been carried out. Through some error by Dulag Luft in transmitting this information to the authorities at Bruex, the latter were not ready for the attack, which actually took place on or about the 12th May, 1944. In other cases, however, warnings were given in time, particularly after some of the more seriously threatened German industries, including oil refineries, had been put in direct contact with Dulag Luft. It should be added that alternative targets noted in aircraft briefings also served as an indication of future targets, even when not actually attacked on the mission in question.

The German defence forces were very much interested to learn which of the German defences had been recognised, and how they were assessed as targets. On one occasion the German Flak batteries were informed of gaps in the Flak belt, designated by code names and co-ordinates which appeared on some captured maps.


Evidence in Camera: Invasion Edition

Evidence in Camera was a restricted fortnightly magazine issued by Air Ministry Intelligence. It contained a selection of aerial photography taken over a two week period to illustrate military achievements and failures.

Below are several pages from a special 'Invasion Edition' of Evidence in Camera showing images from the first week of the Allied invasion of Normandy from the night of 5th/6th June 1944.

Evidence in Camera Invasion Edition

The Oslo Report

The British Naval Attaché at the Oslo Legation, Rear-Admiral H Boyes, received an anonymous package at the beginning of November 1939 detailing German secret weapons development. The document contained information on such things as radar development, remote controlled gliders, acoustically and magnetically detonated torpedoes, and long-distance air navigation techniques with suggested countermeasures. The report also revealed Peenemünde and Rechlin as Wehrmacht experimental weapons test sites.

Three copies of the Oslo report with drawings and English translation were forwarded to the Director of Naval Intelligence on 6 November 1939.

After the war it was established that the report had been supplied by German mathematician and physicist Hans Mayer.

The first part of the report is reproduced below and includes copies of the drawings.


Misguided British assessment of Japanese intentions in the Far East

This is an illuminating telegram sent by the British Commander-in-Chief Far East and China on 1 October 1941. It is an assessment of the current situation in regards Japanese military intentions over the coming months. The assessment proved to be rather inaccurate. Within three months Japan had attacked the U.S. fleet at Perl Harbor, sunk the two Royal Navy capital ships HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse off the coast of Singapore and the Japanese Army had begun its ultimately successful invasion of Malaya.


The Facts about Rudolf Hess

A British Foreign Office report on the first interview with Nazi Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess following his surprise landing in Great Britain in May 1941.

(Taken from the National Archives, file reference: FO 371/34484)


Rudolf Hess

Hess flew to Great Britain in a Me. 110, from which he landed by parachute in the evening of the 10th May, 1941, at Eaglesham in Scotland. He was wearing the uniform of a captain in the German Air Force. He gave his name as Alfred Horn and stated to the Home Guard and the Police that he was on a “special mission” to see the Duke of Hamilton, and that he had intended to land at Dungavel, 12 miles distant from the spot where he landed.